Prices for great expectations dating service

Rated 3.80/5 based on 879 customer reviews

It is sufficient if defendant made available the matching of members ․ or supplied the means for matching the members” [citations omitted]; accord, Chassman v.

Co.1994, Greenfield, J.], member profile, photos and video maintained at company's center for perusal by other members, such services were covered by statute because “It does not matter whether defendant actually matches its members.

S.2d 246 (1st Dept.2004), the Appellate Division applied the Dating Services Law to an Internet social referral service with far less expensive services and viewed any distinction regarding the use of the Internet as too insignificant to merit discussion. Second, in both cases, the defendant's form contract violated every mandate of the Dating Service Law, with the single exception that each contract did contain notice of a three day “cooling off” right to cancel (G.

Accordingly, was the maximum lawful charge for each contract. The posture that defendant's services were not governed by the law in any respect also is demonstrated by the failure to provide to the clients written notice of the mandatory “Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights” (G.

Doe met no one through the service but, at some point, stopped checking with the service to see if any other clients had reached out to her.

Doe's contract, the personal shopper membership paragraph is stricken. Roe testified that she was introduced to no prospective suitors and met only one person who approached her after seeing her posted information; Ms.

Two claimants sue to recover, respectively,

It is sufficient if defendant made available the matching of members ․ or supplied the means for matching the members” [citations omitted]; accord, Chassman v. Co.1994, Greenfield, J.], member profile, photos and video maintained at company's center for perusal by other members, such services were covered by statute because “It does not matter whether defendant actually matches its members. S.2d 246 (1st Dept.2004), the Appellate Division applied the Dating Services Law to an Internet social referral service with far less expensive services and viewed any distinction regarding the use of the Internet as too insignificant to merit discussion. Second, in both cases, the defendant's form contract violated every mandate of the Dating Service Law, with the single exception that each contract did contain notice of a three day “cooling off” right to cancel (G. Accordingly, $25 was the maximum lawful charge for each contract. The posture that defendant's services were not governed by the law in any respect also is demonstrated by the failure to provide to the clients written notice of the mandatory “Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights” (G. Doe met no one through the service but, at some point, stopped checking with the service to see if any other clients had reached out to her. Doe's contract, the personal shopper membership paragraph is stricken. Roe testified that she was introduced to no prospective suitors and met only one person who approached her after seeing her posted information; Ms. Two claimants sue to recover, respectively, $1,000 and $3,790 paid under a contract for defendant's services, which offer to expand a client's social horizons primarily through posting a client's video and profile on an Internet site on which other clients can review them and thereafter, as desired, approach a selected client for actual social interaction. Upon the basis of the contract and testimony, the court determines that the transactions were subject to the Dating Services Law, which regulates defined “social referral services” falling within the scope of General Business Obligations Law § 394-c (G. In relation to the application of the Dating Services Law, more than a decade ago, it was judicially determined that the Law did cover services which match members by creating a location and mechanism for members to assess each other by reviewing another member's video, photograph and profile a substantially similar service to the one defined by the written contract terms here (Great Expectations Creative Management, Inc. Attorney-General of the State of New York, 162 Misc.2d 352, 356-357, 616 N.

||

It is sufficient if defendant made available the matching of members ․ or supplied the means for matching the members” [citations omitted]; accord, Chassman v.

Co.1994, Greenfield, J.], member profile, photos and video maintained at company's center for perusal by other members, such services were covered by statute because “It does not matter whether defendant actually matches its members.

S.2d 246 (1st Dept.2004), the Appellate Division applied the Dating Services Law to an Internet social referral service with far less expensive services and viewed any distinction regarding the use of the Internet as too insignificant to merit discussion. Second, in both cases, the defendant's form contract violated every mandate of the Dating Service Law, with the single exception that each contract did contain notice of a three day “cooling off” right to cancel (G.

Accordingly, $25 was the maximum lawful charge for each contract. The posture that defendant's services were not governed by the law in any respect also is demonstrated by the failure to provide to the clients written notice of the mandatory “Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights” (G.

Doe met no one through the service but, at some point, stopped checking with the service to see if any other clients had reached out to her.

Doe's contract, the personal shopper membership paragraph is stricken. Roe testified that she was introduced to no prospective suitors and met only one person who approached her after seeing her posted information; Ms.

Two claimants sue to recover, respectively, $1,000 and $3,790 paid under a contract for defendant's services, which offer to expand a client's social horizons primarily through posting a client's video and profile on an Internet site on which other clients can review them and thereafter, as desired, approach a selected client for actual social interaction.

,000 and ,790 paid under a contract for defendant's services, which offer to expand a client's social horizons primarily through posting a client's video and profile on an Internet site on which other clients can review them and thereafter, as desired, approach a selected client for actual social interaction.

The statute's reference to “actual damages” was added to the Dating Service law in 1992 (L. Based upon the foregoing, the court awards actual damages of the face amount of the contract to each claimant, with interest to commence on the date of the contract payment. § 394-c), and as a part of the same legislation newly authorized the Attorney General to bring enforcement actions and to seek civil penalties of up to

The statute's reference to “actual damages” was added to the Dating Service law in 1992 (L. Based upon the foregoing, the court awards actual damages of the face amount of the contract to each claimant, with interest to commence on the date of the contract payment.

§ 394-c), and as a part of the same legislation newly authorized the Attorney General to bring enforcement actions and to seek civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation (G. However, such contracts may no longer simply be set aside as contrary to public policy, as was done in the 1991 decision based upon an earlier version of the Dating Service Law (Chassman v.

§ 394-c [9][a]; see, for example, People by Vacco v. It then follows that the legislature, by adding the “actual damage” language to the statute in 1992 did not erode New York State's commitment to protect consumers from price gouging by dating services.

Defendant had the obligation to assure that each client of the dating service was made aware of statutory rights by providing each with the “Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights” (G. As to the manner of the report, it shall be accomplished by forwarding a copy of this decision to the appropriate public officials. The boilerplate printed form contracts has standard terms, reciting that plaintiff would receive a “photo shoot, video, workbook on dating, counseling, background checks, [and] dating etiquette” (para. The clients' failure to cancel their contracts is irrelevant where the contract itself does not recite a specific number of social referrals per month. § 394-c(4), which provides:“Every contract for social referral service which requires payment by the purchaser of such service of a total amount in excess of twenty-five dollars shall provide that in the event that the seller of such service does not furnish to the purchaser the specified certain number of social referrals for two or more successive months the purchaser shall have the option to cancel the contract and to receive a refund of all monies paid pursuant to the cancelled contract with the exception that the seller shall be entitled to retain as a cancellation fee fifteen per cent of the cash price or a pro rata amount for the number of referrals furnished to the purchaser, whichever is greater. § 394-c[1] [b], “ ‘ancillary services' ․ [include] grooming, cosmetology, dating etiquette, dating counseling, or other services”) arguably should have no separate economic value (G.

In this case, each claimant, both appearing to be intelligent, well spoken and attractive professional women, carefully negotiated the services to be provided. As to the exercise of such discretion, in a 1988 opinion, the Advisory Committee wrote (1) that the “desirability or appropriateness ․ depends on all the circumstances, such as the nature of the [offense], the effect of such report on the administration of justice, and, in particular, on the court's truth determining function, and whether it was revealed by the perpetrator's voluntary testimony,” (2) that a report could be “undesirable” if it “would dissuade witnesses on trial from telling the whole truth or encourage the threat of possible criminal proceedings as a means of pressure, for settlement purposes or otherwise, by one litigant against another” and (3) a judicial decision to report would be proper if the judge concluded “reporting such a revealed [offense] is in the public interest” (Joint Opinion 88-85 and 88-103, December 8, 1988), The court considers the following factors: (1) that reporting the wrongful activity found impacts upon the public interest, given that the acts violated rules governing a regulated industry and appear to reflect a continuing pattern and practice on the part of the defendant as indicated by, among other things, the use of a printed boilerplate form found not to be in accordance with applicable laws; (2) the court's past and future truth determining function in each matter has not been, and will not be, impacted by a potential or actual report because no threat of future reporting was posed during the course of these proceedings, and these matters are now disposed; and (3) a question touching upon the administration of justice and the integrity of a court order may be posed in that a similar course of conduct by the same or a related defendant was previously litigated (Great Expectations Creative Management, Inc. Attorney-General of the State of New York, supra ). § 394-c[2-a], “No social referral service provider shall require the purchase of an ancillary service by a purchaser of a social referral service as a condition of entering into a social referral service contract with such provider”).

||

The statute's reference to “actual damages” was added to the Dating Service law in 1992 (L. Based upon the foregoing, the court awards actual damages of the face amount of the contract to each claimant, with interest to commence on the date of the contract payment. § 394-c), and as a part of the same legislation newly authorized the Attorney General to bring enforcement actions and to seek civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation (G. However, such contracts may no longer simply be set aside as contrary to public policy, as was done in the 1991 decision based upon an earlier version of the Dating Service Law (Chassman v. § 394-c [9][a]; see, for example, People by Vacco v. It then follows that the legislature, by adding the “actual damage” language to the statute in 1992 did not erode New York State's commitment to protect consumers from price gouging by dating services. Defendant had the obligation to assure that each client of the dating service was made aware of statutory rights by providing each with the “Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights” (G. As to the manner of the report, it shall be accomplished by forwarding a copy of this decision to the appropriate public officials. The boilerplate printed form contracts has standard terms, reciting that plaintiff would receive a “photo shoot, video, workbook on dating, counseling, background checks, [and] dating etiquette” (para. The clients' failure to cancel their contracts is irrelevant where the contract itself does not recite a specific number of social referrals per month. § 394-c(4), which provides:“Every contract for social referral service which requires payment by the purchaser of such service of a total amount in excess of twenty-five dollars shall provide that in the event that the seller of such service does not furnish to the purchaser the specified certain number of social referrals for two or more successive months the purchaser shall have the option to cancel the contract and to receive a refund of all monies paid pursuant to the cancelled contract with the exception that the seller shall be entitled to retain as a cancellation fee fifteen per cent of the cash price or a pro rata amount for the number of referrals furnished to the purchaser, whichever is greater. § 394-c[1] [b], “ ‘ancillary services' ․ [include] grooming, cosmetology, dating etiquette, dating counseling, or other services”) arguably should have no separate economic value (G. In this case, each claimant, both appearing to be intelligent, well spoken and attractive professional women, carefully negotiated the services to be provided. As to the exercise of such discretion, in a 1988 opinion, the Advisory Committee wrote (1) that the “desirability or appropriateness ․ depends on all the circumstances, such as the nature of the [offense], the effect of such report on the administration of justice, and, in particular, on the court's truth determining function, and whether it was revealed by the perpetrator's voluntary testimony,” (2) that a report could be “undesirable” if it “would dissuade witnesses on trial from telling the whole truth or encourage the threat of possible criminal proceedings as a means of pressure, for settlement purposes or otherwise, by one litigant against another” and (3) a judicial decision to report would be proper if the judge concluded “reporting such a revealed [offense] is in the public interest” (Joint Opinion 88-85 and 88-103, December 8, 1988), The court considers the following factors: (1) that reporting the wrongful activity found impacts upon the public interest, given that the acts violated rules governing a regulated industry and appear to reflect a continuing pattern and practice on the part of the defendant as indicated by, among other things, the use of a printed boilerplate form found not to be in accordance with applicable laws; (2) the court's past and future truth determining function in each matter has not been, and will not be, impacted by a potential or actual report because no threat of future reporting was posed during the course of these proceedings, and these matters are now disposed; and (3) a question touching upon the administration of justice and the integrity of a court order may be posed in that a similar course of conduct by the same or a related defendant was previously litigated (Great Expectations Creative Management, Inc. Attorney-General of the State of New York, supra ). § 394-c[2-a], “No social referral service provider shall require the purchase of an ancillary service by a purchaser of a social referral service as a condition of entering into a social referral service contract with such provider”).

,000 for each violation (G. However, such contracts may no longer simply be set aside as contrary to public policy, as was done in the 1991 decision based upon an earlier version of the Dating Service Law (Chassman v. § 394-c [9][a]; see, for example, People by Vacco v. It then follows that the legislature, by adding the “actual damage” language to the statute in 1992 did not erode New York State's commitment to protect consumers from price gouging by dating services. Defendant had the obligation to assure that each client of the dating service was made aware of statutory rights by providing each with the “Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights” (G. As to the manner of the report, it shall be accomplished by forwarding a copy of this decision to the appropriate public officials. The boilerplate printed form contracts has standard terms, reciting that plaintiff would receive a “photo shoot, video, workbook on dating, counseling, background checks, [and] dating etiquette” (para. The clients' failure to cancel their contracts is irrelevant where the contract itself does not recite a specific number of social referrals per month. § 394-c(4), which provides:“Every contract for social referral service which requires payment by the purchaser of such service of a total amount in excess of twenty-five dollars shall provide that in the event that the seller of such service does not furnish to the purchaser the specified certain number of social referrals for two or more successive months the purchaser shall have the option to cancel the contract and to receive a refund of all monies paid pursuant to the cancelled contract with the exception that the seller shall be entitled to retain as a cancellation fee fifteen per cent of the cash price or a pro rata amount for the number of referrals furnished to the purchaser, whichever is greater. § 394-c[1] [b], “ ‘ancillary services' ․ [include] grooming, cosmetology, dating etiquette, dating counseling, or other services”) arguably should have no separate economic value (G. In this case, each claimant, both appearing to be intelligent, well spoken and attractive professional women, carefully negotiated the services to be provided. As to the exercise of such discretion, in a 1988 opinion, the Advisory Committee wrote (1) that the “desirability or appropriateness ․ depends on all the circumstances, such as the nature of the [offense], the effect of such report on the administration of justice, and, in particular, on the court's truth determining function, and whether it was revealed by the perpetrator's voluntary testimony,” (2) that a report could be “undesirable” if it “would dissuade witnesses on trial from telling the whole truth or encourage the threat of possible criminal proceedings as a means of pressure, for settlement purposes or otherwise, by one litigant against another” and (3) a judicial decision to report would be proper if the judge concluded “reporting such a revealed [offense] is in the public interest” (Joint Opinion 88-85 and 88-103, December 8, 1988), The court considers the following factors: (1) that reporting the wrongful activity found impacts upon the public interest, given that the acts violated rules governing a regulated industry and appear to reflect a continuing pattern and practice on the part of the defendant as indicated by, among other things, the use of a printed boilerplate form found not to be in accordance with applicable laws; (2) the court's past and future truth determining function in each matter has not been, and will not be, impacted by a potential or actual report because no threat of future reporting was posed during the course of these proceedings, and these matters are now disposed; and (3) a question touching upon the administration of justice and the integrity of a court order may be posed in that a similar course of conduct by the same or a related defendant was previously litigated (Great Expectations Creative Management, Inc. Attorney-General of the State of New York, supra ). § 394-c[2-a], “No social referral service provider shall require the purchase of an ancillary service by a purchaser of a social referral service as a condition of entering into a social referral service contract with such provider”).

Leave a Reply